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Does an overhang in capital equipment still exist? If so, will investment spending
continue to decline? This article finds that an overhang may still exist for some
subsectors of investment, such as telecommunications equipment. This will lead
to below-trend growth in the near future. However, the authors forecast a capital
underhang by the end of 2002, which implies strong investment growth by 2003.
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A defining feature of the most recent
economic slowdown has been the rap-
id decline of business fixed investment
spending. It wasn’t that long ago that
this sector was growing at 12.2%
(2000:Q2), but growth had slowed dra-
matically by the end of 2000,
leading to a year of nega-
tive growth in 2001. While
investment spending is tra-
ditionally very sensitive to
cyclical downturns, there
were two notable features
of the recent decline in in-
vestment spending. First, it
declined very rapidly. Sec-
ond, it led the overall eco-
nomic slowdown. This has
generally been attributed
to the buildup of excess cap-
ital stock during the heyday
of the Internet bubble.
This Chicago Fed Letter ad-
dresses two questions. First,
does an overhang in capital
equipment still exist? Sec-
ond, if there still is an over-
hang, will investment spending continue
to decline in the near future? We mea-
sure overhang using four different ap-
proaches, described below. All four of
these approaches lead us to the same
conclusion. Overhang may still exist
for some subsectors of investment, such
as telecommunications equipment. This
will lead to below-trend growth in the
near future. However, it does not signal
further declines in investment spending.
Instead, it signals an investment path that
is consistent with our current invest-
ment forecast of 4.7% growth in 2002.
Approach 1: Capacity utilization
One measure of overhang is capacity
utilization. Manufacturing capacity uti-
lization bottomed in December 2001 at
72.9% and was still only 73.2% in Febru-
ary, well below its average of 81.5% over
the last 40 years. Over that entire period,
capacity utilization was lower than today
only in 1975 and 1982. By this measure,
there definitely is an overhang.
This raises the question of whether ca-
pacity utilization will inhibit growth in
the near future. Figures 1 and 2 provide
evidence on the relationship between
capacity utilization in the present and
investment growth in the near future.
Figure 1 shows the cross-correlation of
capacity utilization with business fixed
investment growth. It shows that capaci-
ty utilization is positively correlated with
lagged business fixed investment growth.
In other words, falling investment is
correlated with low capacity utilization
1. Cross-correlation of BFI with CU
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NOTE: Cross-correlation of capacity utilization (CUt ) and annualized
growth of quarterly real business fixed investment (BFIt+k ).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.a few quarters out. This is not surpris-
ing, given that a drop-off in demand
for investment goods will likely cause
both investment good production and
capacity utilization to decline.
The relevant question, however, is wheth-
er low capacity utilization today predicts
low investment growth in the future.
Figure 1 shows that there is a positive
correlation between capacity utilization
today and investment growth over the
next two quarters. This indicates that to-
day’s low capacity utilization signals that
investment growth will be below trend
for the next two quarters. However, ca-
pacity utilization is negatively correlated
with investment growth three or more
quarters in the future. This indicates
that today’s low capacity utilization
signals that investment growth will be
above trend by the end of the year.
Figure 2 shows capacity utilization and
investment growth during episodes
when capacity utilization fell below 75%.
The vertical line running through the
0 denotes the quarter in which capacity
utilization reached its trough. The hor-
izontal line running through 0 denotes
zero investment growth (investment
changes above the zero line denote
growth). Note that, of the 1961, 1975,
and 1982 episodes, only in 1982 was
investment growth negative one quar-
ter after the trough of capacity utiliza-
tion. Therefore, figure 2 also suggests
that today’s low capacity utilization in-
dicates only slightly below-trend growth
in the future.
One caveat to this upbeat analysis is
that in previous downturns, capacity
utilization bounced back reasonably
quickly, along with demand for new
manufactured goods. Many observers
argue that because sales of durable
goods were high last year, the quantity
of durable goods sold will increase
slowly this year. This may inhibit the
rebound in capacity utiliza-
tion and, thus, the demand
for new investment goods.
Note, however, that in 1975
capacity utilization bounced
back slowly yet investment
bounced back quickly. Over-
all, we believe that our in-
vestment forecast for sluggish
but positive growth over the
next two quarters is consis-






Another way of thinking
about investment overhang is
to consider recent changes
in investment growth. Con-
sider the following explana-
tion for the drop in invest-
ment spending last year. For
some reason, such as the de-
cline in equity prices over the
past two years, firms decided
that their current capital
stock was too high, creating
an investment overhang.
Therefore, firms began cut-
ting investment spending in
order to bring their capital stock down
to the newly desired level.
Overhang can persist for some time if
it is costly to cut investment spending
instantaneously. While it may be rela-
tively cheap to cancel projects that have
not yet begun, it is costly to cancel
projects that are half-completed, such
as the building of a new factory. As a
result, investment spending can decline
for an extended period. Investment
will continue to decline until firms have
reached their new desired level of cap-
ital stock. However, once firms reach
this point, investment should no long-
er decline. In other words, the path
for investment growth will look like a
U with a single trough so long as there
are no further shocks to the desired
capital stock. We would not expect in-
vestment to decline rapidly, hold steady,
and then decline rapidly again, which
would make the investment growth path
look like a W.
2. Episodes with CU manufacturing below 75% since 1960
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NOTES: Dashed line indicates forecast. CUMFG is on the left scale; BFI is on the right.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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CUMFGThe data presented in figure 2 are con-
sistent with this story. Note that the
investment paths tend to have a single
trough. This is not exactly true in
1960–61, where investment had troughs
in both 1960:Q3 and 1961:Q1. Howev-
er, in both the 1974–75 and 1982 re-
cessions, investment spending had a
single trough.
Given that investment spending will
likely be below trend in 2002:Q1, there
still may be some overhang. Neverthe-
less, the slower rate of decline in invest-
ment spending likely signals that the
remaining overhang is small. After all,
if businesses still have a large overhang,
why have they stopped cut-
ting investment spending?
Approach 3: Actual
capital stock versus that
predicted by a model
Our final two approaches
involve comparing the true
capital stock with the capi-
tal stock predicted by a
model. If the current capi-
tal stock is above the level
predicted by a model, then
there is evidence of over-
hang. Our third approach
uses the prediction of most
models of investment that
the ratio of the nominal
capital stock to nominal
GDP is stable. These mod-
els are guided by the empirical fact that
the nominal capital to GDP ratio has
been stable for decades, as has the share
of GDP that capital receives (about one-
third). The reasoning is as follows.
When the capital to GDP ratio is rela-
tively high, there is a relatively high
level of capital per worker. This makes
the return on capital low, causing in-
vestment to fall. Figure 3 presents this
ratio. As is clear from the figure, the
nominal capital to output ratio did not
increase during the 1990s. This figure
suggests there is no overhang.
Although the capital to GDP ratio did
not rise rapidly during the 1990s, the
investment to GDP ratio
did rise rapidly, as shown
in figure 3. One reason
that the high investment
to GDP ratio did not lead
to a high capital to GDP
ratio is that much of the
1990s growth in invest-
ment was in computers,
and computers depreciate
rapidly. One thousand
dollars of capital invested
in computers produces a
greater annual service
flow than $1,000 invested
in structures. If the annual
service flow from comput-
ers were not greater than
the service flow from
structures, nobody would
ever invest in computers. Firms must
recoup their computer investment
over only a few years, whereas firms
must recoup their structures invest-
ment over a much longer period.
Given that a high level of capital servic-
es can be obtained with a small capital
stock of computers, it might be reason-
able to think that in the long run the
capital to GDP ratio will fall, while the
capital services flow to GDP ratio will
be stable. Service flow of capital is de-
fined such that the present value of ser-
vice flow from a unit of capital is equal
to its purchase price. A $1,000 comput-
er that fully depreciates in one year gives
an annual service flow of $1,000. A
$1,000 machine that fully depreciates
after ten years has an annual service flow
of approximately $140. Figure 3 shows
that the capital service flow to GDP ra-
tio, normalized to 1 in 1996, increased
slightly in the late 1990s. However, this
run-up was much smaller than the run-
up of the capital services to GDP ratio
during the late 1970s. Thus, the capital
service flow to GDP ratio does not give
any evidence of a large capital overhang.
Approach 4: Recent versus
historical investment growth
An alternative approach is to directly
predict growth in investment. Investment
growth between 1997 and 2000 was well
above its historical trend. Assuming
no overhang in 1997 (i.e., both capital
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4. BFI capital overhang
$ billion (chain-weighted)
NOTE: Dashed line indicates forecast.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
3. Ratios of stocks and flows to GDP
NOTES: Dashed line indicates forecast. For capital service flows, 1996 = 1.
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trend1 This is a much larger estimate of invest-
ment overhang than presented in the
Wall Street Journal article, “High-tech ‘over-
hang’: Economic hangover,” on April 30,
2001. Our estimate for information pro-
cessing alone is $196 billion, versus the
$100 billion cited in that article. There-
fore, vis-à-vis many estimates, we are over-
estimating overhang. We assume that
trend growth rates for information pro-
cessing equipment, non-information
processing equipment, and structures
spending were equal to their average
growth rates between 1960 and 1997. We
also assume annual depreciation rates of
22% for information processing equip-
ment, 12% for non-information process-
ing equipment, and 3% for structures.
2 When broken down by sector, there is an
overhang of $96 billion in information
processing equipment and $77 billion in
non-information processing equipment.
However, there is an underhang of $34
billion in structures at the end of 2001.
3 This model splits business fixed investment
into information processing equipment,
non-information processing equipment,
and structures. Current growth in each
of these sectors depends on lagged
growth rates of investment, profits, the
Institute for Supply Management’s Pur-
chasing Managers Index, and current
and lagged interest rates. This forecast
shows investment spending 4.7% higher
in the fourth quarter of 2002 than in the
fourth quarter of 2001.
stock and investment were at their
trend levels), the 1997–2000 surge in
investment pushed investment levels
above trend. Figure 4 shows the trend
and actual levels of investment, 1997
to present. By this measure, the level
of investment was 8% above trend at
the start of 2001, and the total over-
hang was about $284 billion.1 By
2001:Q4, investment rates were 12%
below trend, and the remaining over-
hang was $139 billion.2 Given arguably
reasonable forecasts of investment,3 in-
vestment spending will fall even fur-
ther below predicted values this year,
causing a capital underhang by the
end of 2002. This indicates strong in-
vestment growth by 2003.
Conclusion
In summary, the four approaches we
presented above point to the possibili-
ty of some investment overhang re-
maining today. However, all four
approaches to investigating overhang
suggest that the remaining overhang is
relatively small and should not signifi-
cantly inhibit growth in investment
spending later in the year.